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TWO WAYS OF BEING CONSCIOUS: 
THE NOTION OF PSYCHIC CONVERSION 
Robert M. Doran, SJ 
Marquette University 
I N THIS ESSAY r WILL PRESENT an overview of what I have called psychic conversion. I will begin by narrating the birth of the idea, then will present a brief schernatic history of its developrnent and principal 
applications to date, and will conclude by presenting rny current thinking, 
which involves connections with the philosophy of Martín Heidegger, the 
depth psychology of C. G. Jung, and the rnirnetic theory of René Girard. It 
will be clear frorn the first section that Heidegger and Jung were influential 
in the very emergence of the idea, but in rny current work I ha ve developed 
sorne new perspectives in their regard, and I will rnention these at the end. 
1. THE BrRTH OF AN IDEA 
An idea is the content of an insight, of an act of understanding. Sorne 
acts of understanding are exciting, while rnost are rnundane and go alrnost 
unnoticed. The insight in question was a "Eureka!" type of event. I can 
still rernember vividly where I was and how it happened. (The quality of 
excitement or exhilaration, of course, is no guarantee that the insight is 
correct.) It occurred in February 1973 in rny room at the Jesuit Residence 
at Marquette University. I was a doctoral student in theology at Marquette 
at the time and was enrolled in a course on the work of Rudolf Bultmann, 
writing a paper on the Heideggerian aspects of Bultmann's thought. 
Bultmann was heavily influenced by Being and Time, which provided him 
with what Lonergan would call the general categories of his theology, the 
categories that his theology shared with other disciplines.1 1 had been deeply 
1 On general categories, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, latest printing 2005), 285-88. 
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immersed in the work of Lonergan since 1967, when I first read Insight, and 
in the spring of 1969 I had participated in a graduate seminar on the later 
Heidegger conducted by William Richardson at Fordham University- the 
most difficult but also the best course I have ever taken. From that time 
forward, and indeed even until today, I have been interested in the relations 
that might be creatively established between Lonergan and Heidegger. 
These relations are quite complex, but let me be quick to add that m y interest 
is in a possible mutual self-mediation of these two figures, which will make 
each of them better than they are without the fusion of their horizons. I'm 
aware that the task has become much more complicated since I raised my 
original questions, due to the emerging information regarding Heidegger' s 
involvement with Nazism and the very complex question of the relation 
of his philosophy to National Socialism. This is a question that cannot be 
answered easily, oneway orthe other. This political involvement- and I don't 
think there can be any question but that itwas a very deep and long-standing 
commitment, and that he was not honest about it in at least sorne of his post-
war statements- contrasts sharply with Lonergan's passionate commitment 
to democracy and to the educational and intellectual development that he 
judged was required to make democracy really work. That commitment 
forms the basis ofhis critica! portrayal of totalitarian systems such as Nazism 
and Stalinist communism (both of which are mentioned by name in chapter 
7 of Insight) as the culminations of what he called the longer cycle of decline 
in cultural history. There are recorded statements that Heidegger made 
while he was rector of the University of Freiburg that embody precisely the 
following description by Lonergan of the final stages of this cycle: 
"Reality" ["Being" (Sein)] is the economic development, the military 
equipment, and the political dominance of the aH-inclusive state. Its 
ends justify all means. Its means include not merely every technique of 
indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diploma tic 
pressure, every device for breaking down the moral conscience and 
exploiting the secret affects of civilized man, but also the terrorism of 
a political police, of prisons and torture, of concentration camps, of 
transported or extirpated minorities, and of total war.2 
2 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 of Collected Works 
of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1992), 257. For the correlative 1933 statements of Heidegger, see the multiple 
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Nonetheless, far too often, engagements by Lonergan's students with 
other thinkers are one-way streets. 1 have always resisted that and found 
it quite antithetical to Lonergan' s own way of reading other authors. As 
David Tracy remarked tome sorne years ago, Lonergan in general- there are 
always exceptions to statements like this- was a very generous reader, and 
a number of his students are not generous readers; they prefer to sniff out 
counterpositions rather than follow his example of making his interlocutors 
better than they really are. 1 have endeavored to follow Lonergan's example 
in my engagement with Heidegger and the other authors that 1 treat in this 
essay and elsewhere. 
William Richardson had commented once that the key to understanding 
Being and Time, the central work of the early Heidegger, was a book that 
Heidegger published two years after Being and Time, namely, Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics. 3 And so while 1 was working on the Bultmann paper, 
or more accurately while 1 was working on Being and . Time while writing a 
paper on Bultmann, 1 was also reading Heidegger's Kant book. It was while 
taking extensive notes on that work that 1 experienced a breakthrough to the 
notion of psychic conversion. 
Heidegger' s book on Kant stresses the role of the transcendental 
imagination in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and further 
emphasizes that this role is not stressed as strongly in the second edition. 
Heidegger wants to retrieve the emphasis on the transcendental imagination 
from the first edition. In Heidegger's interpretation, the transcendental 
imagination as pure time or pure self-affection is the ground of the intrinsic 
possibility of ontological knowledge, that is to say, of the knowledge of 
the Being-structure of beings.4 It is for this reason that William Richardson 
interprets the Kant book as the key to understanding Being and Time. 
It was in this context that the notion of psychic conversion emerged. 1 
realized that what 1 was struggling to integrate with Lonergan's thinking 
could also be called a transcendental imagination, though in a sense very 
long quotations in chapters 10 and 11 of Victor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1989). 
3 For Heidegger, I am relying on two English translations of Seín und Zeit and one of 
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. For Being and Time, there is the first translation by John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) anda later one by Joan 
Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York, 1996). Quotations here are from the first of 
these. For Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (dedicated to the memory of Max Scheler), see the 
translation by James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962). 
4 See especially Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 247-55. 
4 METHOD: fournal of Lonergan Studies 
different from Kant's or from Heidegger's twisting of Kant's meaning.5 The 
language of conversion was familiar tome from the work ofLonergan, whose 
Method in Theology had appeared in 1972, with its emphasis on intellectual, 
moral, and religious conversion.6 The work on Heidegger, both the early and 
the la ter Heidegger, had begun to give me a way of articulating a conviction 
that there is more to what Lonergan calls interiority than the operations that 
begin to be appropriated with the reading of Insight and that are developed 
further with the discussion of judgments of value and decision in Method 
in Theology. Lonergan himself points to that "more" in Method in Theology, 
when he writes, "Distinct from operational development is the development 
of feelings." 7 
But it is a "more" that at least by 1973 few of Lonergan' s students were 
ready to take seriously. The conviction arose forme because for over ayear 
befare the notion of psychic conversion emerged in my thinking I had been 
experiencing quite unexpectedly a period of intense and very interesting 
dream activity. I had consulted a psychologist in Milwaukee, Charles 
Goldsmith, who used sorne Jungian techniques (in a very non-dogmatic 
fashion, I'm grateful to say) in the work of dream interpretation, though 
he was not a Jungian analyst in the strict sense of the term. The dream 
work and the relation of dreams and symbols to feelings confirmed me in 
the conviction that there is more to interiorly differentiated consciousness 
than can be found in Lonergan' s philosophy, particularly the philosophy 
expressed in Insight (which I continue to regard as a great philosophical 
classic, perhaps the greatest of the previous century). 
Reading Heidegger's Kant book was the Archimedes's bath that 
S Ernst Cassirer says that beginning in section 3, Heidegger "no longer speaks as a 
commentator but as a usurper," wresting with violence from Kant what he "intended to say" 
but "recoiled from" beca use he was a prisoner of tradition, "namely, that not only is temporality 
the ground of the transcendental imagination, it is also the basis of the 'selfhood' of the self." 
Ibid., translator's introduction xix-xx. Cassirer probably is correct, but this type of interpretation 
of other thinkers is typical of Heidegger, who is always out to speak his own mind and does 
not hesitate to twist the thought of others in doing so. Contrary to Lonergan's way of reading, 
however, he makes the other thinkers worse than they really were rather than better. Thus, 
for instance and by contrast, Lonergan has interpreted Kant's transcendental imagination as 
inquiry transforming mere experiencing into the scrutiny of observation, trying to promote 
something imagined into something intelligible. This comment was made in the first lecture of 
Lonergan's 1979 course at Boston College on Method in Theology. Recordings and sorne written 
transcriptions of this course will be uploaded on the website www.bernardlonergan.com. 
6 SeeMethod in Theology, esp. 237-44. 
7 Method in Theology, 30. 
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produced the "Eureka!" that became psychic conversion. This does not mean 
that I was comfortable with everything Heidegger says in the Kant book or 
in Being and Time. I am not- far from it. Por example, the first sentence of the 
''Transcendental Aesthetic" in the Critique of Pure Reason reads: "In whatever 
manner and by whatever rneans a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, 
intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to 
which all thought as a means is directed." This is central for Heidegger 
no matter how much he complicates it with hermeneutic phenomenology. 
Por Lonergan, on the other hand, Kant's statement represents the basic 
counterposition. I agreed then and agree now with Lonergan on that 
point. Moreover, when I first read Being and Time, I could not avoid having 
constantly in mind the statement that Lonergan makes in his chapter on 
objectivity in Insight that "'time is' by being within the universe of being," 
rather than that being is to be interpreted in terms of time. 8 This is a radical 
difference, and the diagnostic is none other than what Lonergan calls 
intellectual conversion. I suspect that the difference is rooted in Heidegger's 
work on Scotus in his Habilitationsschrift. Certainly it is in the tradition of the 
univocity of being that stems from Scotus. I agreed then and I agree today 
with Lonergan that such interpretations of the meaning of being are "mere 
intrusions of imagination." I further regard Heidegger's Kant book, where 
the time structure of the transcendental imagination becomes the horizon for 
interpreting the Being-structure of beings, as Exhibit A in demonstration of 
that claim. And yet there is a dimension that is opened by this emphasis 
that is precisely what had been occupying my attention ever since I first 
started reading Heidegger and that had simply become more urgent with 
the exposure to the dream world and to Jung. Somehow, sorne connection 
had to be made between the unrestricted desire to know whose objective 
is everything about everything, an objective "within" which time is, and 
the time-bound concern, Sorge, established by the Einbildungskraft that is for 
Heidegger the ground of the know ledge of the Being of beings. The original 
meaning of psychic conversion, then, as the notion emerged in my own 
thinking,lies precisely in this connection, in this link between two dimensions 
of consciousness (Lonergan) or of Dasein (Heidegger)- and I'm aware that 
Heidegger would not want to speak of Dasein in terms of consciousness, but 
I suspect that this may be because his notion of consciousness (Bewusstsein) 
8 Insight, 404. 
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is notas radical as Lonergan's, or it may be dueto his unequivocal rejection 
of neo-Kantianism - or both. 
Equally important, then, in the emergence of the notion of psychic 
conversion wasthe statementinBeingand Timethat Verstehen (understanding) 
and Befindlichkeit (state of mind or disposition or mood) are equiprimordial 
constitutive ways of being Dasein. "Understanding is grounded primarily 
in the future [whereas] one's state-of-mind ... temporalizes itself primarily 
in having been."9 Transposed into the terminology of Insight and Method in 
Theology, intentional operations, with understanding at their center, and 
the sensitive psyche, are two distinct but inseparable dimensions of the 
self-presence that Lonergan calls consciousness. In either case - and in 
whichever language one wants to use - psychic conversion is the discovery 
of the link between these two dimensions, the establishment of the interior 
communication between them, to use the language Lonergan himself 
employed in Method in Theology when speaking of symbols. Moreover, in 
my view an adequate objectification of psychic conversion would have to 
extend Heidegger' s notion of Verstehen to e o ver all of the dimensions of the 
act of understanding in Lonergan's philosophy, even while Heidegger's 
Verstehen adds an essential clarification, as we will see, to one dimension of 
Lonergan' s thinking. 
Lonergan offered a series of courses on method a t the Gregorian 
University from 1959 to 1962.10 In the first of those courses, "De Intellectu 
et Methodo" ("Understanding and Method") Lonergan enumerates the 
problems that give rise to the issue of method. Among these he includes 
the great chasm that has developed in Western intellectual history and in 
particular in post-Scotus Catholic theology: the chasm opened up between a 
conceptualist intellect, on the one hand, and the images into which genuine 
insight occurs along with the sensitive, affective, and imaginallives of the 
faithful, on the other. This is the same problem in another context. It is only 
partly resolved by correcting Scotist conceptualism and by the intellectual 
conversion that a correct cognitional theory effects. In my first public 
presentation on psychic conversion in 1974, at the first Lonergan Workshop 
at Boston College, I referred to itas a psychic rift. 
At any rate, these are the threads that suddenly and unexpectedly 
9 See the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time at pp. 171-72 and 390. 
10 I am currently editing a volume for publication in Lonergan's Collected Works that 
includes his notes for these courses. 
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carne together forme one afternoon while reading Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics. M y insight was that, in addition to the foundational conversions 
that Lonergan speaks of as intellectual, moral, and religious, there is a fourth 
dimension of conversion. This fourth conversion establishes or reestablishes 
a link that should never ha ve been broken, the link between the intentional 
operations of understanding, judgment, and decision, and the tidal 
movement that begins before consciousness, emerges into consciousness 
in the form of dream images and affects, continues to permeate intentional 
operations in the form of feelings, and reaches beyond these operations 
and states in the interpersonal relations and commitments that constitute 
families, communities, and religions. Needless to say, the inner and outer 
words that are reflected in this recollection had not yet emerged or emanated 
forme; in fact at the beginning I had different names for the conversion 
of which I was speaking- affective, aesthetic, psychological - but a friend, 
Vernon Gregson, who knew exactly what I was talking about, convinced me 
to use the term "psychic conversion." 
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IDEA 
The original idea, then, was tha t there is a fourth dimension of personal 
transformation, one not specifically included in Lonergan' s discussion of 
intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. This does not mean that it is 
unrelated to what Lonergan was talking about, however, and as I attempted 
to weave this idea into the substantial contribution that I hoped to make in 
my doctoral dissertation, I began to frame sorne of these relations. 
When I first presented what I was doing to Lonergan in the fall of 
1973 as I was beginning to put the dissertation together, he asked whether 
what I was saying was in harmony with what he had said about symbols 
and feelings in Method in Theology. He wanted, I could tell, an affirmative 
answer, and indeed thought that the answer should be affirmative. I 
answered affirmatively - but was glad that he didn't ask me to elaborate, 
since I was not yet ready to do so! It was in writing the dissertation that 
the elaboration emerged. The key was the intermediate position of feelings 
between Lonergan's discussion of values in the second chapter of Method in 
Theology and his account of symbols in the third chapter. The link is found 
when one connects the following two citations from those two chapters: 
"Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie 
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apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings" 11 and 
"A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling 
or is evoked by a feeling." 12 If symbols evoke or are evoked by feelings, 
and if values are apprehended in feelings, then feelings may be understood 
as linking symbols and values. And if that is the case, then what I was 
beginning to call psychic self-appropriation, the appropriation of one's life 
of feeling, particular! y as that becomes manifest in the elemental symbols of 
one' s dreams and similar psychological deliverances, might be expected to 
be relevant to one's existential stance as a moral subject, as one having todo 
with values and disvalues; that is to say, it might be expected to play a role 
in what is known as moral and religious discernment. This is the idea that 
was developed in my dissertation, subsequently published by Marquette 
University Press as Subject and Psyche,l3 where the principal interlocutors 
were not only Lonergan but also Paul Ricoeur, Eugene Gendlin, and Jung, 
with an occasional appreciative nod to Heidegger. 
It remained for me next to relate what 1 was talking about to the 
material in Insight on the dialectic of the subject, where Lonergan relies on a 
somewhat moderated or reoriented Freudian position to speak of scotosis, 
repression, disassociation, and dramatic bias. Through a renewed study of 
Insight from the perspective of what I was trying to say, I was able to define 
psychic conversion as the transformation of the censor from a repressive to 
a constructive role in a person' s development. I continued to hold to that 
definition, and would regard it even today asan essential, even if perhaps 
not complete, notion of what 1 mean by psychic conversion. 
Through the 1980s in published articles, in a second book entitled 
Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations, 14 in courses that I taught 
at Regis College in the University of Toronto, and in presentations at the 
Boston College Lonergan Workshops, I continued to mine the resources 
contained in the twofold set of relations that 1 had made with Lonergan, 
namely, relations with Method in Theology and relations with Insight. But at 
the same time I was engaged in writing another book, one which took a good 
11 Method in Theology, 37. 
12 Method in Theology, 64. 
13 Robert M. Doran, Subject and Psyche, 2nd rev. ed (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1994). The first edition was published by University Press of America in 1977. 
14 Robert M. Doran, Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations, 2nd rev. ed. 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006). The first edition was published by Scholars 
Press in 1981. 
- -- ---' 
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decade to put together and became Theology and the Dialectics of History. 15 All 
of this work had for me from the beginning a theological finality, and this 
theological component began to be elaborated in this new work, where 1 
was attempting to derive the categories of a theology of history, that is to 
say, a theology that would understand the principal Christian doctrines in 
relation to the constitution of history. 1 discovered in my explorations of 
Insight that Lonergan hirnself had located a sensitive-psychic cornponent of 
both the dialectic of the subject and the dialectic of community. 
The dialectic of the subject is the dialectic between the neural undertow 
that emerges into consciousness in the form of images and affects, on the 
one hand, and the orientation of the intelligent, rational, existential subject 
constituting one's world and oneself through one's insights, judgrnents, 
and decisions, on the other. The point of the dialectic is not to choose one 
over the other but to ensure that they are working harrnoniously with 
one another. And so 1 carne to call the respective poles of the dialectic, not 
contradictories but contraries. To regard thern as contradictories is to head 
toward personal disaster. There is a tendency among Jungians and other 
psychologically minded people whose implicit or explicit cognitional 
theory needs sorne work to emphasize the psychic pole at the expense of 
the spiritual dimension. But 1 think there is also a tendency arnong sorne 
Lonergan students to neglect the psychic pole and overemphasize intellect. 
The dialectic of cornrnunity is the dialectic between a vital and 
indeed primordial intersubjectivity and practica} intelligence in its 
work of establishing capital forrnation, economic systerns, and political 
arrangernents. Again, the dialectic is one of contraries, not of contradictories. 
Again too, cornmunities are headed to disaster if they so ernphasize either 
the intersubjective pole or the pole of practica! intelligence as to neglect the 
other pole. 
To these two dialectics taken from Lonergan 1 added a dialectic of 
cultural constitutive meanings. 1 called it the dialectic of culture. The 
dialectic of culture is the dialectic between cosrnological and anthropological 
constitutive rneaning. In cosrnological cultures the rneasure of integrity lies 
in the rhythrns of nonhurnan nature, and the process of integrity rnoves from 
these rhythrns first to the cornmunity and then through the cornrnunity to 
15 Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1990). The material on the dialectics of subject, culture, and community and on the scale 
of values contained in the next several paragraphs are all developed in this book. 
10 Mrnmv: Journal of Lonergan Studíes 
individuals. In anthropological cultures at their best the measure of integrity 
líes in a world-transcendent reality that beckons us through conscience and 
grace to attunement with itself, and the process of integrity moves from 
this world-transcendent measure to the individual and then through the 
collaboration of attuned individuals to the establishment of a community 
living in harmony with the measure. But this dialectic, too, is one of 
contraries, not of contradictories. Cultures that emphasize the cosmological 
and have not developed the anthropological are given to a fatalism that 
is linked with too clase an identification with nonhuman schemes of 
recurrence, while cultures that neglect the cosmological risk endangering 
the natural environment with its delicate ecological balances. 
I related these three dialectics to one another through Lonergan's 
scale of values - vital, social (the dialectic of community), cultural (the 
dialectic of culture), personal (the dialectic of the subject), and religious -
and emphasized that in each of the three dialectical processes the human 
psyche has a constitutive role to play in the establishment of integrity, 
whereas distortion would occur, whether in the subject, the culture, or the 
community if one pole of the dialectic (either the spiritual or the psychic) 
was stressed to the neglect of the other. Jungians, I argued, tend to err on 
the side of stressing the psychic over the intentional, whereas Lonergan's 
students may tend to the opposite mistake. I was able through these paths 
to argue that Lonergan's understanding of the dialectic of history in terms 
of the simultaneous interplay of forces that make for progress, influences 
that make for decline, and the redemptive grace of God, could perhaps be 
further differentiated in terms of the integral functioning or the breakdown 
of the scale of values. 
At this point, the background work was finished that was required 
befare I could turn my attention to what I have been engaged in since the 
early 1990s, namely, the construction of a systematic theology. My approach 
to that endeavor has been to begin with the systematic theology that can 
be found in Lonergan's own work, which may be the best theology written 
in a Scholastic mode since Thomas Aquinas, and to transpose it into the 
categories that he suggests in Method in Theology. I have endeavored to 
amplify these categories with the developments that would be provided 
by including psychic conversion in the foundational reality from which 
the categories are derived. I soon discovered- if I had not been aware of it 
from the beginning- that such a task must be collaborative. No individual 
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can write a full systematic theology, in my estimation, no more than any 
single individual can know the whole of contemporary chemistry. It must 
be the work of a community. My own efforts have been centered around 
what Lonergan wrote in the areas of grace and Trinity and, toa lesser extent, 
Christology (though I hope to expand soon on what I ha ve done thus far in 
Christology). I doubt that I will be able to move much beyond these three 
central areas, but at least it will be a start, and I'm hoping that others will 
pickup on it. What I wish todo here is simply to indica te the role of psychic 
conversion in the so-called foundations of such a systematics. 
My first venture into systematic theology as such occurred in an article 
entitled "Consciousness and Grace." 16 It was an attempt to transpose into 
the language of interiority Lonergan's first thesis in a supplement on grace 
entitled "De ente supernaturali." The thesis claims that there is a created 
communication of the divine nature through which operations are elicited 
by which we attain to the very being of God. My question was, What in 
terms of consciousness is a created communication of the di vine nature? This 
article aroused a great deal of debate, far more than I expected. The debate 
centered mainly around my affirmation of a fifth level of consciousness 
beyond the levels of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision 
so prominent in Lonergan' s work. I've always felt that a number of other 
important elements in that article received scant attention, and one of 
these touches intimately on the issue of Befindlichkeit, on the way one finds 
oneself, on the disposition or mood or self-taste that accompanies all our 
intentional operations, that is, on that element of interiority that my talk 
of psychic conversion attempts to highlight. I was affirming that this self-
taste is changed by the reception of God' s love. That in fact was the central 
point in the article, and it was by and large lost in the debate over how 
many levels of consciousness there are. The difference in one' s self-presence 
that results from being on the receiving end of unqualified love, whether 
that experience be explicitly religious or not, had already been explored in 
chapter 8 of Theology and the Dialectics of History, but now I was explicitly 
linking that change to the religious dimensionas, if you wish- and this is 
not language that I used in "Consciousness and Grace" - a formal effect 
of the gift of God's love. In other words, I was proposing that what in my 
16 Robert M. Doran, "Consciousness and Grace," MErHoo: Journal of Lonergan Studies 11, 
no. 1 (1993): 51-75. A revised version rnay be found on the website www.lonerganresource.corn 
under "Scholarly Works 1 Books 1 Essays in Systernatic Theology." 
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lgnatian tradition was known as discernment, which has todo with what 
lgnatius Loyola calls "the affections," could be intimately related to what 1 
was speaking about in my talk of psychic conversion. 
This emphasis on the change in one's dispositional immediacy (i.e., 
self-taste) became more and more prominent in successive papers on the 
same material through the 1990s, and into the new century, culminating 
as such in several papers delivered in 2005 linking my thought directly to 
the lgnatian Spiritual Exercises. 17 To address Heidegger for a moment, there 
is a Befindlichkeit that results from what Karl Rahner called the supernatural 
existential. This term arose from Rahner's implicit dialogue with Heidegger. 
1 would probably conceive the latter somewhat differently from Rahner, as 
the gift of God' s unqualified love appropriated by the existential subject. This 
appropriation occurs either through sorne intense religious experience or, as 
is more often the case, through recollection of the gifts of God in the course 
of one's life. This appropriation attests toa Befindlichkeit that is quite different 
from the prevailing mood conveyed in Being and Time. The latter mood can 
hardly be called either peaceful or happy. (The later Heidegger may be a 
different story.) This emphasis, and not anything about the number of levels 
of consciousness, was the central affirmation of "Consciousness and Grace."18 
This emphasis on dispositional transformation (Befindlichkeit) as a result 
of the gift of love has figured more centrally of late as 1 have attempted to 
make a contribution to the reawakening of the Augustinian and Thomist 
approaches to a psychological analogy for the Trinitarian processions. But 
before 1 mention anything in that regard, 1 wish to indica te another return to 
Heidegger that occurred in the early years of the present century. It appears 
in a paper entitled "Reception and Elemental Meaning" and in other papers 
that built on affirmations contained in that first development. 19 The psyche is 
for Lonergan identical with what he calls empirical consciousness, the level 
of experience as distinguished from the levels of understanding, judgment, 
17 The two most important of these papers may be found on www.lonerganresource.com 
as Essays 18 and 19 in the e-book Essays in Systematic Theology. 
18 Lonergan students would be well advised to move as quickly as possible beyond the 
"level" language that figured so heavily in the debate over "Consciousness and Grace," but 
only once the clarification has been made of precise! y what Lonergan himself was talking about 
when he affirmed five and in one place six levels. The metaphor of levels is now an obstacle, 
and the issue is one of focusing on sublating and sublated operations and states, which is what 
the metaphor was intended to elucidate in the first place. It has done its job, and it is time to 
discard it. 
19 See Essays 13 and 14 in Essays in Systematic Theology. 
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and decision. But the fact that Lonergan in Insight begins his presentation of 
what he would cometo call intentional consciousness with five chapters on 
empírica! science has, in my view, contributed to an impoverished notion 
of empírica! consciousness among many of Lonergan's students as simply 
data uninformed by any human acts of meaning. This impoverished notion 
of empírica! consciousness had been haunting me from the beginning in the 
work on psychic conversion, but 1 didn't find the appropriate way to address 
the problem until this work on "Reception and Elemental Meaning." The fact 
is that in Insight itself Lonergan mentions, in his initial presentation of levels 
of consciousness in chapter 9, that "utterances" and "free images" are among 
the data presented to consciousness at the empiricallevel, and that these are 
already under the influence of "higher" levels even as they are presented 
at the empiricalleveJ.2° Later he would emphasize that the data of human 
science and theology are themselves invested with human and at times 
di vine acts of meaning, so that (and here 1 am using my own words) there 
is sorne kind of Verstehen involved at the very first level of consciousness-
not, of course, the originating act of understanding that emerges from one's 
own questions, but something that 1 think is compatible with Heidegger's 
insistence on the universality of hermeneutic structure. Again, 1 related 
psychic conversion to this emphasis, in that psychic conversion establishes 
the link of the higher so-called levels with empírica! consciousness. This 
link, I suggested, also enables us to integrate Heidegger's notion of truth as 
aletheia, undisclosedness, and Lonergan's insistence on the truth of judgment 
emanating from the grasp of a virtually unconditioned. In brief, that grasp 
is not possible without aletheia. The "letting-be" of data and insight is part 
of the very process of verification that leads to the grasp of the virtually 
unconditioned. Nonetheless, that letting-be must yield to the unconditioned 
before the truth that occurs formally only in judgment is attained. 
Let me return, though, to the attempts that 1 am currently engaged in to 
offer sorne developments on the psychological analogy for understanding 
Trinitarian processions. 
There are four versions in the history of Western Trinitarian theology of 
what has cometo be called the psychological analogy. Neither Augustine 
nor Aquinas used the language of analogy in proposing their views, but 
the effective history of their Trinitarian theologies has established analogical 
20 See Insight, 299. 
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language as the correct way in which to retrieve their achievements. The 
structure of the analogy is the same in all four versions, and the principal 
difference líes in the first element in the analogy, namely, the analogue for 
the Father. 
All too briefly: In Augustine, the analogy begins with memoria, which on 
one interpretation means the state in which mens, the mind, finds itself, and 
so Befindlichkeit; that state gives rise toa word, verbum, and from memoria and 
verbum together there proceeds love. Thus the Father is remotely analogous 
to memoria, the Son to verbum, and the Holy Spirit to amor. 
In Aquinas, the analogue for the Father is intelligere, the act of 
understanding as it speaks or utters (dicere) what it understands; the Son is 
the Word spoken by the Father; and the speaking and Word together breathe 
the Love that is the Holy Spirit. 
Essentially the same analogy is found in the early Lonergan, but with 
refinements. First, the word that is the proper analogue for the Son is a 
judgment of value, iudicium valoris, though this is mentioned explicitly only 
once in Lonergan' s Trinitarian systematics, De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica 
(now available with Latin-English facing pages as The Triune God: 
Systematics). 21 Second, the analogical process of "intelligible emanation" 
in the human subject has been submitted to far more rigorous analysis by 
Lonergan than ever was explicit in the work of Aquinas, though Lonergan 
has argued convincingly in his study of verbum in Aquinas that what he is 
saying is entirely congruent with Aquinas' s understanding. 
The fourth version, if you want, of the psychological analogy is presented 
by the later Lonergan, and in this account the analogue for the Father is the 
higher synthesis of knowledge and feeling that is the dynamic state of being 
in love. From this there proceeds the judgment of value that is the analogue 
for the Son, and from the two together there proceed acts of love that are the 
analogue for the Holy Spirit.22 
All four, in m y view, work to provide a remote and obscure hypothetical 
understanding of what Christians confess abotit God every time they recite 
the Nicene Creed: God from God, Light from Light, true God from true 
God. The analogies of Aquinas and especially the early Lonergan manifest 
21 See Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. 
Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 181. 
22 See Bernard Lonergan, "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections," in A Third 
Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 93-94. 
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strictly what the First Vatican Council said about theological understanding, 
namely: that reason illumined by faith, when it inquires devoutly, carefully, 
and soberly, is able to achieve sorne imperfect, obscure, and fruitful 
understanding of the divine mysteries by analogy with what we know by 
our native powers of understanding and reason. In other words, such effort 
can yield a valuable analogy with naturally known realities. Augustine' s 
presentation and, I submit, that of the later Lonergan are taken from the 
dimension of graced experience, and I follow through on this in my own 
suggestions for an analagy that is explicit about the graced or usupernatural" 
context of the analogy. I retrieve Augustine's memoria precisely as the graced 
realization af Befindlichkeit, that is, as the state of mind that results from a 
summation af ane's life gathered to provide evidence that one has known 
unqualified love in one's own regard. This evidence, grasped in what I would 
callan existential-ethical reflective insight, grounds an ineffable judgment of 
value that slowly and aver time becomes formulated in the faith that is the 
knowledge born of religious lave. And from these tagether there praceeds 
the love of the ane who gave the gift, a love that Christian thealogy calls 
charity. Thus forme grace itself has a Trinitarian structure: gift, faith, and 
love. That structure may be vécu ar thématique, implicit or explicit, in actu 
exercito or in actu signato. As I have expressed it here, it is appropriated in a 
quite thematic fashion, but it is "ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of 
us to join."23 And the graced Befindlichkeit that I first tried to call attention 
to in uconsciousness and Grace" now becomes the analogue for the eternal 
Father.24 Psychic conversion has, then, become part af the ground far the 
derivation af special theological categories. 
3. CoNTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS 
In this final section, I can anly briefly sketch where my thaught has 
gane regarding the applicatians and significance of the notion af psychic 
canversion. I will begin with the mimetic theory of René Girard, mave ta the 
notian of individuation in the analytical psychalogy af Jung, and canclude 
with a suggestion regarding the appropriate relation of Heidegger's 
Verstehen and Befindlichkeit. 
23 Method in Theology, 290. 
24 This suggestion may be found in Essay 32 in Essays in Systematic Theology, "Sanctifying 
Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling: A Key to the Nexus Mysteriorum Fidei." 
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The mimetic theory of René Girard has become for me the principal 
way of designating what I mean by what Lonergan calls drama tic bias, that 
is, the aberration of sensitivity itself that psychic conversion enables one to 
acknowledge. Girard's work can be related to Lonergan's if we begin with 
the following statement that appears in Lonergan's Trinitarian systematics: 
we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we 
undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and 
fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, 
through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously 
inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, 
weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and 
exercise our will in order to act. 25 
Again, this statement provides a perfect introduction to what I am 
attempting todo in proposing the notion of psychic conversion: establish 
the link between these two ways of being conscious. They are never distinct 
from each other. However, the first way, which Girard discloses to be not 
only sensitive and psychic but also intersubjective or, to use his neologism, 
"interdividual," stands in need of a great deal of therapeutic endeavor on 
the part of the vast majority of human beings. This therapeutic endeavor 
is aimed at the purification of the motive at the heart of our beseeching (to 
draw from T. S. Eliot and remotely Julian of Norwich), lest that motive be 
contaminated with unacknowledged mimetic impulse and consequently 
distort the very unfolding of our intentional operations. We are originally 
interdividual in ways that differ from one person to another, depending, in 
my view, on the extent to which love has been communicated to the psychic 
dimension of the person in one's earliest years. But no matter how healthy 
that interdividuality may be, without sorne prolonged work on our part we 
will almost inevitably covet what our neighbor has or is, not for its own 
sake, but simply because he or she has or is what he or she has or is. This is 
the mimetic dimension to which Girard calls attention, and his elaboration 
of the manner in which it wreaks havoc on the human community is a 
permanent contribution, in my estirnation, to our understanding of desire. 
M y recovery of the notion of psychic conversion, now in relation to the 
25 The Triune God, 139. 
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interdividuality that is stressed by Girard, has given me a way to return to 
J ung, and specificall y to his notion of in dividua tion. The in dividua tion process 
is the process of untangling the vagaries of interdividuation. But I would 
suggest that a remarkably reliable way in which to pursue the individuation 
process is through the self-appropriation of the operations entailed in being 
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible- a self-appropriation aided greatly 
by immersion in the work of Lonergan. 
Finally, all of this brings me back to further reflections on Heidegger and 
his equiprimordial ways of being Dasein, that is, Verstehen and Befindlichkeit. 
I think Befindlichkeit became Gelassenheit in the later Heidegger, where 
thinking is thanking, Denken is Danken, and Dasein is more at rest and at 
pea ce than in Being and Time. I may be wrong, but I hope this is the case. But I 
would also like to propose in conclusion that Lonergan can teach Heidegger 
something about the relation of Befindlichkeit to Verstehen, of affective states 
to understanding, that might facilitate finding the link between these 
dimensions (and between these two thinkers). In Lonergan's thinking there 
is a vertical finality of the psyche to participation in the life of the human 
spirit, in the operations of understanding, judging, deciding, and loving. 
In one sense they are equiprimordial, as Heidegger insists, in that they are 
seldom or never found apart from each other. But in another sense that 
equiprimordiality is qualified. In Lonergan's emergently probable universe, 
what is purely coincidental from the standpoint of a lower level becomes 
intelligible as it is .1/systematized" at a higher level: physical, chemical, 
biological, psychological, spiritual, to paint the picture in broad strokes. 
Befindlichkeit has its own horizontal finality, and the early Heidegger seems 
content to remain there. But the reality meant by the term Befindlichkeit never 
becomes what it could become until it finds its link with the adventures of 
understanding, affirming, deciding, and being loved and loving. That link 
provides it with a vertical finality to something greater than itself, and as 
it finds that link it becomes what it could never have become otherwise. I 
genuinely hope that there might be evidence of this in the contemplative 
atmosphere found in sorne of the later writings of Heidegger, but whether 
that is the case or not, I propase that these later writings provide us with 
clues that we might well rely on as we learn what it is to obey the first 
of Lonergan's transcendental precepts, the precept that enjoins a task on 
empirical consciousness itself, on Befindlichkeit, and so the precept that is 
related to psychic conversion: Be attentive. 
